

---

## Ethnoarchaeology and undefined investigations

---

Eric Laurier, Chris Philo

Department of Geography and Geomatics, University of Glasgow, Glasgow G12 8QQ, Scotland;  
e-mail: [elaurier@geog.gla.ac.uk](mailto:elaurier@geog.gla.ac.uk), [cphilo@geog.gla.ac.uk](mailto:cphilo@geog.gla.ac.uk)

Received 20 February 2003; in revised form 9 October 2003

---

**Abstract.** The historical archaeology of Foucault and the ethnomethodology of Garkinkel and Sacks may be regarded as rather different traditions in sociocultural inquiry, and for human geography, but there are arguably a number of distinctive points of overlap. In this paper, and following the example of McHoul's consideration of the affinities between Foucault and Garfinkel, we explore these overlaps, paying particular attention to what Foucault, Garfinkel, Sacks, and others have to say about both 'local rules' as opposed to 'transcendent laws' and the prioritising of 'surfaces' over 'depths'. In so doing a window is opened on the possibilities for an 'ethnoarchaeological' human geography inspired by both traditions, not as a definitive answer to the question 'what next' in the discipline but as another lens through which ongoing manoeuvres might be viewed.

### 'What next?'

We hear a question. Anything could happen. The world is filled with promise, terror, boredom, love, work (so much work), and sometimes surprises. We might go to the park. We might have to fill in an evaluation form. We might find ourselves daydreaming. We might stay silent under interrogation. We might go shopping for food for dinner. We might say 'we do not know'. We *really* might not know.

For us, as a pair of researchers, the question finds its relevance in a long-standing task, to write a paper where we examine the warrants for our inquiries individually and together. As left foot follows right and right follows left, in this paper we will walk through our singular and shared studies in the poetic, political, and practical legacies of Foucault and ethnomethodology. More particularly, we will retrace the faltering steps that Chris (Philo, 1989) has taken in the pathways of Foucault's arguably most difficult book, *L'Archéologie du Savoir* (*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault, 1972), together with the perplexing paces that Eric (Laurier, 2001; Laurier et al, 2002) has made more recently around the shop floor of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967; 2002; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; Livingston, 1986; 1987; Lynch, 1993; Lynch and Bogen, 1996; Sharrock and Anderson, 1986). Previously we have collaborated in examining the work of others, notably that of Latour (Laurier and Philo, 1999), and in the analysis of empirical materials such as the daily routines of car-based workers (Laurier and Philo, 2003a) and community life in the public spaces of cafés (Laurier and Philo, 2003b). Up until now, we have refrained from too close an inspection of one another's intellectual backgrounds, resources, and commitments. Yet there is value in the kind of exercise that makes available for our investigation what 'others' intend in what they do, such as when we try to dance with a partner, carry a piano downstairs together, or play them at cards. We hope that our own pause for inspection can hold some interest for other geographers wondering about the conceptual manoeuvres that may come to invigorate endeavour within (and beyond) the discipline. We say this less because we suppose there to be some special 'answer' in conjoining Foucault's archaeology with Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, and more because it may be

in the principle of conversations between different styles of thinking—in hybridisations of topical concerns and, most of all, ways of investigating—that ‘what next’ will reside.

For us, in the event of writing this statement, we hear ‘what next’ as *something* we have been planning that perhaps ought to happen. It means that we will begin considering the affinities and complementarities between Foucauldian historical investigations, Foucault’s archaeology, and the studies of practical action and practical reasoning otherwise known as ethnomethodology. Foucault’s work has been enthusiastically absorbed by numerous disciplines, raising his influence on the humanities and social sciences to a level where he is thought of in some quarters as the Marx of the 20th century. By comparison, ethnomethodology has been treated as something of a curiosity in the development of the social sciences, its practitioners pursuing ‘studies’ with a missionary zeal and dismissing attempts to integrate their findings, methods, or conceptual clarifications into other programmes of social, cultural, and psychological research.<sup>(1)</sup> Their studies are, by their own self-assessment, *asymmetrically alternative* to, it would seem, *any* other kind of project in the social sciences: “The following of the methodologies of one makes the other ‘disappear’”, writes Watson (1992, page 1), as “the methodologies are radical alternatives to each other, fundamentally disjunctive rather than being complementary or reconcilable by means of an additive formula which juxtaposes and purportedly articulates the two.” With such warnings about the ethno-inquiries of Garfinkel, Sacks and others in mind, we nevertheless wish to argue in sympathy with McHoul (1986; 1996) for the peculiar appropriateness of reconciling ethnomethodology with the work of Foucault. Indeed, as Watson (1992, page 1) adds, “there can certainly be no *a priori* objection to each and any reconciliation, as much of course depends upon the logic of the particular cases in point”.<sup>(2)</sup> We might in fact argue that, by its very popularity, Foucault’s work has suffered more than ethnomethodology from being skimmed for its ‘big ideas’,<sup>(3)</sup> then affiliated and, all too often, *inappropriately* added to other theoretical frameworks in the social sciences and cultural studies.

In our daily research practice, we find our footing in these two distinctive ways of pursuing empirically bound investigations of classical topics in philosophy, human geography, history, sociology, critical theory, and so on. By our own convenient short-hands for one another’s approaches, we have traded on a division between Foucault’s forms of ‘self-serious discourse’ in circulation and the attention of ethnomethodology to common-or-garden spatial phenomena and talk-in-interaction. By contrasting the two, each has given us purchase where the other starts to let slip. On the other hand, ethnomethodology is the programme “*par excellence* that has been able to generate detailed findings about concrete social situations and the forms of semiosis that produce them (and that, reflexively, they produce). On the other hand, Foucauldian discourse analysis has been superbly capable of situating discourse in terms of its general effectivity as a means of producing (and being produced by) forms of knowledge, power and subjectivity in their broadest historical senses” (McHoul, 1996, page 101). This observation arises in McHoul’s (1986; 1996) illuminating remarks on the “two quite

<sup>(1)</sup> If there is one substantial gain to be had from ethnomethodology meeting human geography, it is that there has not been an antagonistic history in previous encounters, in stark contrast to the ‘dark’ status of ethnomethodology in other social sciences.

<sup>(2)</sup> It is highly appropriate to set Watson’s and McHoul’s remarks on ethnomethodology side by side, as Watson has perhaps most clearly expressed why ethnomethodology *cannot* straightforwardly be added to, or combined with, other approaches. McHoul, at one time Watson’s student and to whom *Semiotic Investigations* is the “answer—for Rod—though I don’t doubt he’ll disagree with it” (1996, page xxii), offers a nuanced argument about the poststructural approaches to which ethnomethodology *could* fruitfully be aligned.

<sup>(3)</sup> ‘Panopticism’ is a favourite: see Philo (1992; also Sharp et al, 2000), wherein it is bemoaned that the Foucault best known to geographers remains ‘the geometer of power’ (see Foucault, 1977).

theoretically distinct sociologies” (1986, page 65) of Garfinkel and Foucault. In an exploration of the public methods for communicating (‘passing on’) the private knowledge of sexuality, McHoul considers ‘touchstones’ for the two traditions, alongside the singularities of each, which are incommensurate. His ambition for his own ‘semiotic investigations’ is that they should be able to stretch from the ‘situational’ via the ‘social’ to the ‘historical’ (1996, page 101). It is in McHoul’s initial meeting of ethno-methods and discourses that the term ‘ethnogenealogy’ is coined, and we make no special point in calling our follow-up to his lead ‘ethnoarchaeology’. McHoul uses archaeology and genealogy interchangeably in his essay, and Philo similarly has argued, contra Deleuze and others, for a measure of continuity between Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies.<sup>(4)</sup> More broadly, we remain wary of giving a name at all to ‘*what next*’ for reasons that will become clearer later.

To follow the straightforward division of the strengths of archaeology and ethnomethodology put forward by McHoul, Foucault provides a historicism which ethnomethodology lacks. From the other side, ethnomethodology localises what otherwise risk becoming grand periodisations within Foucault’s histories. As Chris has emphasised from the outset (Philo, 1992; 2004), to follow the examples set in Foucault’s historical geographies entails the avoidance of ‘total histories’ in favour of ‘general histories’: a disavowal of grand-theoretical simplifications, even if ready to provide ‘big-picture’ historical surveys, and a preference for ‘untidy’ inquiries where chaos and incommensurability in the stuff of the inquiries are readily foregrounded. While retaining a wariness over the background presence of an ‘overall master plan’ in Foucauldian studies, Lynch (one of the figures in ethnomethodology who, alongside McHoul, is willing to hybridise it with other approaches, if cautiously and critically),<sup>(5)</sup> points toward this same contrast:

“Foucault’s descriptions nevertheless can be exemplary for ethnomethodological investigations, because they so clearly identify how material architectures, machineries, bodily techniques, and disciplinary routines make up coherent phenomenal fields. Whereas Foucault problematises the diachronic continuity of historical discourses, ethnomethodology explodes the contemporaneous landscape of language games into distinctive orders of practice, which are neither hermetically sealed from one another nor expressive of a single historical narrative” (Lynch, 1993, page 131).

In what follows we will sketch out a template, building on McHoul’s and Lynch’s links, that ethnoarchaeologies might follow. What we are doing is not a *demonstration* of an ethnoarchaeological study, and for better and for worse it is just an *argument* in favour of such studies.<sup>(6)</sup> Our ambition is to fashion a series of specific hinges around which we will swing between Foucault’s archaeology and Garfinkel and Sack’s ethnomethodology, and we will deliberately mix up our discussions of each, avoiding setting them out in stark

<sup>(4)</sup> It should be underlined that our reading of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* is through the lens provided in the preface to the English edition, which was written round about the same time as “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire” (1971; translated 1986), wherein Foucault talks of the boring, grey task of historical work. At this point in Foucault’s development ‘archaeology’ and ‘genealogy’ look much the same, as descriptions of a stance before history and its traces, whereas we accept that subsequently ‘genealogy’ begins to look more like an empirical grasp on the workings and lineages of *power* (see also Matless, 1992).

<sup>(5)</sup> Ethnomethodologists have always been happy to hybridise with practitioners such as the police, film makers, jazz players, astronomers, truckers, lawyers, builders, engineers, nurses, and designers, pursuing studies grounded in the vernacular expertise of those groups which are uniquely adequate rather than general models or theories.

<sup>(6)</sup> As Rawls (2002, pages 63–64) notes of Garfinkel’s style, “theoretical demonstrations depend hopelessly on imagined orders of affairs. Therefore, his position should not be advanced as an argument, but rather as a demonstration. Thus Garfinkel has consistently met theoretical criticism by attempting to deepen the level of empirical detail in his research, not via theoretical response.”

contrast to one another. We presume some passing familiarity with both of these approaches—some prior grasp of Foucault’s archaeological concern for documents and discourses, and of the concern of ethnomethodology for practical action and reasoning—and we acknowledge that there are moments in our argument where quite ‘technical’ elements of the two are presented with limited exegesis. We nonetheless hope that the broader implications, the spirit even, of these elements will remain accessible.

**‘We will call it ethnoarchaeology’: formal properties and rules**

As with so many snappy titles foisted on larger intellectual projects, such as ‘deconstruction’ or ‘actor-network theory’, ‘ethnomethodology’, although not all that snappy, has allowed for short definitions which make something arguable and locatable in the social, cultural, and historical disciplines while ignoring its rich corpora. Interviewed on the origins and meaning of the term, Garfinkel was characteristically combative:

“I am going to tell you right now that I cannot be held responsible for what persons have come to make of ethnomethodology. Here I am talking about ‘ethnomethodology’, because there are now quite a number of persons who, on a day-to-day basis, are doing studies of practical activities, of common-sense knowledge, of this and that, and of practical organisational reasoning. That is what ethnomethodology is concerned with. It is an organisational study of a member’s knowledge of his ordinary affairs, of her own organised enterprises, where that knowledge is treated by us as part of the same setting that it also makes orderable ... one way to start this meeting would be to say, ‘we’ve stopped using ethnomethodology. We are now going to call it “neopraxiology”’. That would at least make it clear to whoever wants the term ethnomethodology, for whatever you want it for, go ahead and take it. You might as well since our studies will remain without that term. I think the term may, in fact, be a mistake. It has acquired a kind of life of its own” (1974, page 18).

Similarly, the ‘archaeology of knowledge’ offers a name which has tended to supplant the body of work, to be wondered about in isolation, to start generating questions about Foucault’s efforts that might be seen as quite misplaced were his collection of substantive studies consulted. It also ignores the specificity of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault, 1972) as a ‘topical’ study of how enduring knowledge is made (and archived), and as such it is not straightforwardly a window onto Foucault’s methodology, even if there *are* elements that can be extracted to stand as more programmatic claims about history and our attempts to excavate it. Rather than implying the unearthing of the foundations on which knowledge rests, though, Foucault’s use of ‘archaeology’ relates to the slow removal of soil with delicate hand-tools, the trowelling, picking, and brushing away of dirt, to reveal the shape of the object normally surrounded by soil. It is thus a term that refers analogously to the investigator’s practice rather than to a more metaphoric sense of digging down (and we will return to this depth metaphor later). Various writers, Deleuze (1988) amongst them, talk about *The Archaeology of Knowledge* as summarising Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ approach as taken in his inquiries up until this book; they distinguish this phase in his work from a later ‘genealogical’ approach hung up on power. We would remain at best cautious about such a division in Foucault’s progress and at worst see it as misleading. It can throw readers off the track in the same way as does the over-emphasised switch in Wittgenstein’s work between the *Tractatus* (1961 [1922]) and the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) (Hacker, 1989; 2000).

An initial point of juxtaposition between archaeologies and ethno-inquiries is that Foucault attains a philosophical vantage point rejecting any commitment to *naturalism* or any employment of *formal language systems*, whereas ethno-inquiries are committed to *naturalistic studies* and are centrally concerned with *formal structures*

*of practical actions*. Might this, however, not be quite the fundamental disjunction that it first appears? Consider the distance separating Foucault's view of discourse from the heritage of structural linguistics and semiology that has on occasion been posited as the fashioning taproot of his particular project. Anderson (1983), for instance, places Foucault beside Derrida and Lacan as structuralists or neostructuralists still writing squarely in the space opened up by Saussure's *Course in General Linguistics*, and as fellow antagonists to the Marxist heritage of historical materialism. A more sophisticated inquiry is erected by Callinicos (1982),<sup>(7)</sup> who is closer to Megill (1985) in emphasising the Nietzschean heritage in the thinking of both Foucault and Deleuze, but both Callinicos and Megill continue to portray Foucault quite clearly as an heir of the revolution of language marked out by Saussure's decisive break with earlier classical doctrines of language. The claims advanced by Anderson, Callinicos, and Megill contain many seeds of truth, but we would argue that the original version of structural linguistics—and even the later appropriations of that vision by various French theorists—evinces a *naturalism* and *formalism* that are rarely seen in the pages of Foucault's many texts.

He is hence still mischaracterised as a scholar searching for *Discourse*, which is taken to be a *system* like *la langue* of Saussure's *langue/parole* structural binary. As he locates his own work in one interview from 1967:

"I am at the difference from those we call structuralists for I am not very interested in the formal possibilities offered by a system like language (*la langue*). Personally, I am above all haunted by the existence of discourses; by the fact that speaking has taken place as events in relation to their original situation, and that they have left behind traces which continue to exist and exercise, in their very subsistence internal to history, a certain number of manifest or secret functions" (Foucault, quoted in Lemert and Gillan, 1982, page 21).

Clearly, Foucault warns off those who would place him amongst the structuralists (and see also Foucault, 1972, pages 199–211). He is signalling his concern for speaking—meaning both verbal utterance and written inscription—as an event that can be properly understood only by placing it in its original situation, and also with reference to how its 'traces'—its verbal repetition or written circulation—continue to have an effect on history, on actions, politics, institutions, and other events for some time after the original event of speaking.<sup>(8)</sup> What is therefore required is the careful articulation of the statement back into the local and historical conditions that made it possible, the 'curtain' or 'base' that is there for investigation and behind which there may be nothing else or more to discern:

"That everything is always said in every age is perhaps Foucault's greatest historical principle: behind the curtain there is nothing to see, but it was all the more important each time to describe the curtain, or the base, since there was nothing behind it nor beneath it" (Deleuze, 1988, page 54).

In short, for Foucault what is said *is* what is said, as part of the conditions, 'curtain', or 'base' specific to the 'age' (place, context, setting, situation) in question, and there is no need for any further formalistic analysis of *other* extra-discursive<sup>(9)</sup> or transcendent

<sup>(7)</sup> He parallels Anderson in seeking to avert philosophical assaults on Marxism.

<sup>(8)</sup> Too much weight should not be put upon 'secret' in the above remark from Foucault, as the function of speech in its place, in its various contexts of production, reproduction and consumption, is secret only in so much as it is not immediately available to 'us' (as researchers) in the same way as we might understand pieces of speech (utterance, inscription) in 'our' own everyday circumstances.

<sup>(9)</sup> This is precisely not to imply that what is said has no relationship to a material real of nondiscursive phenomena, far from it; it is simply that Foucault does not suppose that what is said can be straightforwardly 'read off' from the economic, social, political, and cultural orders in which the 'saying' is embedded. See also Philo (1989) for further discussion of Foucault's conception of discourse as a specific order of historical reality running alongside, and being abutted by, various other orders with an extra-discursive character.

principles governing what could be said and not said. There is nothing behind the 'curtain' or beneath the 'base', a point to which we will return later.

Where Foucault emphasises his *disinterest* in the formal possibilities of language, Garfinkel and Sacks are deeply interested in formal structures but *indifferent* to any principled distinction between professional sociological (or psychological or cultural or historical) reasoning and "legal reasoning, conversational reasoning, divinational reasoning, psychiatric reasoning, and the rest" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, page 342). Although sharing what might be called a 'constructionist' attitude to social activities, "the two understand formal structures differently and in incompatible ways" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, page 342). From a cursory reading of the published work in conversational analysis, it has been easy for critics to imply that it *is* a formal account of just the kind that Foucault and many other poststructuralists would want to dispute. Both Garfinkel and Sacks were fond of tables, diagrams, and unusual textual renderings of phenomena (see Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992), which could easily be confused with an attempt to create formal, cohort-independent models, rules, or laws. Yet Garfinkel, in particular, would use such diagrams to demonstrate the inescapable *loss* of a phenomenon by *any* rendering practices, and also to make the rendering process—the 'curtains' of scientific methodology, as it were—more obviously visible. At a more conceptual level, meanwhile, ethnomethodology collapses the semiotic binary used by Saussure, showing through frequent perspicuous examples that *la langue* does not exist outside of its use in *la parole*. It follows Wittgenstein's (1980) later dismissal of the possibility that we should use 'ladders' to climb up and out of ordinary language. Garfinkel and Sacks, in their (only) joint paper, argue that practices, language games, and workplaces—indeed, all aspects of everyday life—contain the very possibility of their own existence, comprehensibility and analysability,

"(a) in that they exhibit upon analysis the (properties of uniformity, reproducibility, repetitiveness, standardisation, typicality and so on; (b) in that these properties are independent of particular production cohorts; (c) in that particular cohort independence is a phenomenon for members' recognition; and (d) in that the phenomenon (a), (b), and (c) are every particular cohort's practical situated accomplishment" (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970, page 342).<sup>(10)</sup>

Hopefully it is becoming apparent that ethnomethodology develops a very odd kind of interest in formal properties which does not seek its *own* formal system that would liberate, democratise, correct, perfect, or ironicise existing practice—contra, say, Habermas's (1980) search for the ideal speech situation (Bogen, 1989). In his 1963 paper on sociological description, Sacks critiqued the 'ironic' stance of classical sociology for applying external standards that, as Watson (1992, page 117) puts it, are "derived from the formal categories or procedures of science, or, worse, an idealised version of them". Continuing, Watson (1992, page 117) adds that "All too often, this results in common-sense understandings being deemed primitively deficient, superficial, misconceived, inadequate, interested, stereotypical, mystificatory—in short as an inferior, naïve or degenerate version of what is yielded by the (idealised) scientific approach." Clearly, then, this is a state of affairs very close to Foucault's own departure from similar 'ironic' structuralist formalisations of language, with both archaeologies and ethno-inquiries in effect foregrounding background expectations alongside dispersed 'serious'

<sup>(10)</sup> For a more accessible account of this dense passage from an equally dense paper, see Livingston (1987). We expect readers unfamiliar with ethnomethodology not to follow the detail of this passage, merely to gain the sense that, insofar as there is a formalism in Garfinkel and Sacks's work, it is *not* about supposing there to be 'big rules' that guarantee or control the production of social order. Rules are studied instead in the sense that particular staff enact them or use them to account for their actions and so on. They are not taken to exist outside their practical accomplishment.

---

techniques of ordering. We would argue that it is mistaken to oppose Foucault and ethnomethodology on the basis of one's rejection of formalism and the other's apparent focus upon it.

To elaborate further, we would suggest that Foucault embraces a conception of rules and laws similar to that of ethnomethodology, as he rejects any attempt to propose 'cross-cultural, ahistorical, abstract laws' somehow operating outside of, beyond, behind, or below the concrete, dispersed details of particular historical and geographical conjunctures (Philo, 1992). His feeling is instead for rules as specific, local, and mutable conditions of *existence* or, more specifically in his work on discourse, as regularities snaking across the various levels of the *enunciative field*, which are effectively both statements themselves *and* their specific conditions of existence. Deleuze (1988, page 5) puts it thus: "A statement operates neither laterally nor vertically but transversally, and its rules are to be found on the same level as itself." When such regularities are definable—and the analyst's job is *not* to do the defining, but *to find definable regularities*—then Foucault accepts that "for the sake of convenience we are dealing with a *discursive formation* ... The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, modes of statements, concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the *rules of formation*. The rules of formation are conditions of existence (but also of coexistence, maintenance, modification and disappearance) in a given discursive division" (Foucault, 1972, page 38, emphases in original). The details of how Foucault envisages statements coming together into recognisable discourses across the enunciative field are laid out in Philo (1989), but for the purpose of the current paper what matters is the theoretical import of asserting that the existence, substance, and location of a statement and the rules for its location and operation are *homologous*—one and the same.

At this point it is worth offering another brief aside on conversation analysis (CA), which has emerged as one possible development of the work of Sacks. Critiques of CA's drift away from the early concerns of Sacks (1963), and perhaps more tellingly of ethnomethodology, towards a scientific and formalist approach, have been advanced by both Bogen (1999) and Lynch (1997). In an elucidation of the difference between the corpus of materials used by CA practitioners and the archive as used by Foucauldian scholars, McHoul and Grace (1995, pages 30–31) put it thus: "Foucault's archive is not just a collection of texts or materials ... but the form of organisation of the parts of a discourse (its statements) ... Classically, CA's version of discourse looks for techniques of saying—how turns are taken in conversations, for example. By contrast, Foucault's discourse theory looks for techniques of 'what can be said.'" In Lynch's (1993; Lynch and Bogen, 1996; 2001) recommendations as to how Sacks's diverse collection of lectures might be read and reused by those not wishing to pursue 'classical CA', he pushes back toward the 'second movement' in most of Sacks's (1992a; 1992b) lectures. This second reflective movement is towards examining the relation of a conversational fragment to *what* can be described, *what* can be offered as a possible story in and about the world, and leads to questioning the very possibilities of telling, knowing, describing, seeing, and doing analysis at all.

The position outlined above could not be further removed from the universal, Humean rules and laws sought by many conventional social scientists, or indeed from a focus on the systematic and structural regularities sought by structuralists at the expense of how such regularities were—for Foucault as archaeologist-historian—and are—for ethnomethodologists of contemporary practice—made, produced, or assembled. Against the promises of explanation from history or sociology, it aligns Foucault's repeated claim to the effect that archaeology is a 'descriptive enterprise' with the insistently descriptive approach of ethnomethodology to language (Lynch, 1993, page 199). There is no need from either position to build a second-order *Discourse* to comprehend discourses, nor to strive for a meta-*T*heory of theories. Instead, there is a requirement to supply descriptions of

actual historical and social statements, phenomena, and activities that explode the essentialised meanings of *see*, *know*, *reason*, *picture*, and so on, which develop into, as Lynch (1993, page 199) concludes, “hypostatised concepts such as Knowledge, Representation, Reason and Truth”. This move toward situated, local, practical productions of, say, reasoning, or searching for the truth, does not entail any kind of scepticism or, worse, despair about truth or reason: “nothing could be further from the case. If an investigation attends to how an expression (for example, a ‘statement’ in Foucault or a ‘usage’ in Garfinkel) comes to be *counted* as true, historically or situationally, this does not mean the investigator is sceptical of that expression’s status as true once it has been so counted” (McHoul, 1996, page 105).

Where Foucault’s attention alighted upon the problem of documents and discourses, he claimed that “The question proper to such an analysis might be formulated in this way: what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?” (1972, page 28); or, more precisely, the researcher must ask, “how is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (page 27). Foucault thus sets himself the task of chipping away at the limits partitioning off what is said at a *particular* time and place from what is not said. In a very real sense, he had previously been concerned with the investigation of these limits,<sup>(11)</sup> but it was only in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* that he first set about codifying his position explicitly, and first demonstrated—albeit in “the cautious stumbling manner of this text” (page 17)—just how this position could be translated into a methodology. The outcome was, by his own admission, “a whole apparatus whose sheer weight, and, no doubt, somewhat bizarre machinery are a source of embarrassment” (page 135; see Philo, 1989, especially figure 11.2, page 223). We would argue that is *not* necessary to pursue Foucault into the heart of this ‘bizarre machinery’, as one can easily be a competent and sensitive archaeologist without ladening one’s analyses with the bewildering profusion of notions and terms that constitute this precarious edifice.<sup>(12)</sup> The richly textured pages of *Madness and Civilisation* (Foucault, 1988), *The Birth of the Clinic* (1973), and *The Order of Things* (1970) readily attest to this claim, as these texts clearly display Foucault’s archaeology at work even if most of the notions and terms of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* are not immediately present.<sup>(13)</sup> Moreover, we believe that archaeology is more of a style, a set of commitments to what is right there before you in its ground, than a starkly laid out and unequivocal manual of research procedures. In consequence, “... in Foucault as well as Garfinkel there is a common method, and this means not ‘accepting’ social facts that must be explained after the fact; rather it means, in Garfinkel’s phrase, catching ‘the work of fact *production* in flight,’ ... . Passages from Garfinkel’s *Studies* on the accomplishment of social facts appear uncannily parallel to Foucault’s treatment of the construction of truth(s) ... . Both writers find their topics in the relation between work (activities) and conditions of possibility (available methods) that, in quite local circumstances, lead to certain accounts being heard and accepted as ‘true’ or as ‘the facts,’ where this analytic method contrasts with those that try to adjudicate between different accounts’ veridicality (for example, theories of ‘ideology’)” (McHoul, 1996, page 104).

<sup>(11)</sup> He had been concerned with tracing the historical and, we would add, geographical ‘moments’ when previous limits were overcome and things started to be said differently: that is, when madness was named as a human pathology, or when the interior of the body became an object of inquiry, speaking, and naming.

<sup>(12)</sup> Once again for reasons of space, we can only footnote here the striking similarity of the uses of ‘machinery’ in Sacks’s (1992a; 1992b) lectures and the recommendations of ethnomethodologists to beware of being drawn too deeply into giving technical names to what any competent speaker can do.

<sup>(13)</sup> For geographical readings and inflections of the first two texts mentioned here, see Philo (2000; 2004).



There is a kind of existential priority running through Foucault's work—he insists that he is *haunted* by the existence of things—and those of ethnomethodologists, which constantly turns them towards studying *what* exists.<sup>(14)</sup> This in no way minimises the access to the problem of social order, as social order is taken to be at work at all points, particular practical solutions being produced everywhere and at all times. What is important is to assemble a corpus, because from a properly assembled corpus an investigator acquires not just, say, 'data' but also a feel for how such 'data' are possible. As Deleuze (1988, page 18) argues, "once the corpus has been established (which does not in any sense impose limits on the statement), we can then determine the way in which language [*langue*] gathers round or 'falls' into this corpus". By way of contrast, structuralism studies systems which give numerous possibilities and some impossibilities, but if an impossibility for the system *is* found to exist, then the system has to be conceptually pulled to pieces and reassembled to be able to contain this possibility too.

### The depths of surfaces

"Methodologically, then, it seems very difficult to stick to what is actually stated, to nothing but the actual inscription of what is said. Even (and above all) linguistics does not remain content with that, especially when its classifications are on a different level from what is said."

Deleuze (1988, page 15)

Where there are some of the most striking harmonies between Foucault's approach to examining the traces of history and the orientation of ethnomethodology to explicating 'seen but unnoticed' features of the present day is in their firm resolve to face up to what is immediately, obviously available, *just there*. As Deleuze hints above on the challenge of staying with what you have at hand, and in his claim quoted earlier about examining the workings of 'the curtain', there is no need to set off on a search for the Wizard of Oz in either Foucauldian or ethnomethodological studies. Both approaches turn *first* to the techniques, technologies, practices, methods, statements, and so on that may *later* allow for characters, agents, or subjects to appear as mighty rulers, pathetic small men pulling levers, or as 'sincere liars'—as Lynch and Bogen (1996) call Oliver North. There is, if you will pardon the mild paradox, a *deep* concern with the *surfaces* of the world. Indeed, as Lynch and Bogen (1996, page 16) express it with respect to the surface of the text:

"In view of the fact that so much social-scientific, literary and philosophical effort has been devoted to getting to the bottom of discourse, our aim of sticking to the surface of the text may strike some readers as curious. It is our view, however, that any deeper readings would have to ignore the complexity and texture of the surface events, and thus they would fail to explicate how an order of activities is achieved as a contingent, moment-by-moment production."

Neither Foucault nor ethnomethodologists are convinced by the 'unsaid' or the 'sub-conscious' or 'total history' or by any other devices that usher in invisible explanations of order. Relentlessly, even tediously, they are concerned with the order that is made available and is everywhere to be examined. There is nothing hidden, although there are countless things that we are urged to notice, things that we have come to ignore

<sup>(14)</sup> It is hence instructive that Elden's (2001) excellent recent text draws so many parallels between Heidegger and Foucault: between the spatialisations inherent in Heidegger's treatment of *Dasein*, 'equipment', and 'world' and Foucault's 'spatial history' of limits. The connections between Foucault and a tradition of Continental existentialist thought are persuasive, and hang in the background of the present paper (see also below).

through excessive familiarity with them in the archive or through witnessing, doing, and hearing them again and again on a daily basis. Both approaches are duly concerned with things lying in plain view, open to everyone, and yet all too often unexamined

Targets for Foucault are hermeneutic and structuralist studies which probe into the murky depths of the ‘unsaid’: hermeneutic studies searching for unexplained meanings, understandings, and intentions locked in individual and group psyches, and structuralist studies searching for the impersonal rules that determine how possible and actual parts of the documents interrogated combine together. Foucault’s analysis renders such explanations ‘invisible’ or largely irrelevant because he shows how events had to be put *in place* so that something like an ‘inner psyche’ became a historical possibility.<sup>(15)</sup> Similarly, ethnomethodology has dissolved questions of social order that predefine hidden superstructures to which only analysts apparently have privileged access, and they have also targeted varieties of psychology seeking explanations of reason and conduct in an only indirectly accessible inner mental or cognitive realm (Coulter, 1983; 1999).<sup>(16)</sup> There is an intriguing relationship here to phenomenology, particularly given the shift from a Husserlian obsession with deep ‘essences’ rooted in the ‘lifeworld’, that horizon of preconscious meaning supposedly common to all humankind, to Schutz’s interest in more everyday ‘structures of meaning’ constituted in the shared experiences and communication of ordinary human groupings (as discussed in human geography by Gregory, 1978a, pages 123–146; 1978b; Ley, 1977; 1978). Although Husserl’s critique of natural science forms “a precursor to Michel Foucault’s and Garfinkel’s postphenomenological investigations” (Lynch, 1993, page 117), and despite the fact that Schutz’s work formed the basis for Garfinkel’s doctoral critique of Parsons’s theory of social action, there remains a suspicion—for both Foucault and the ethnomethodologists—that too much store is being placed here on preformed, overly coherent and, at bottom, simply too all-determining realms of meaning that are *not* there in the surface of things (whether transcendental or more everyday).<sup>(17)</sup>

Building on this distancing from hermeneutic and structuralist studies, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* Foucault hunts for a completely new approach to the problem of how to disinter some ‘reality’ from the stubborn existence of documents. He stresses the need to treat documents seriously on their own terms, and he signposts this treatment as an archaeological excavation of documents as *monuments*: “The document, then, is no longer for history an inert material through which it tries to reconstitute what men [sic] have done or said, the events of which only the trace remains; history is trying to define within the documentary material itself unities, totalities, reveries, relations” (Foucault, 1972, page 7). There is no attempt to read beneath the document because he supposes that the document itself reveals at least as much, if not more, information about the ‘reality’ of the human agency and social practices involved in its formation as can positivistic, hermeneutic, or structuralist inquiries. Furthermore, Foucault’s archaeology, by staying much closer to the document,

<sup>(15)</sup> In other words, he reverses the chronology: something like ‘inner psyche’ is not the ahistorical explanatory key that we can plug in to explain a given social situation, but rather is itself a construct, a human invention, becoming possible—as something to be theorised, debated, taught to students—only *after* certain ‘bits and pieces’ of reality happened to fall into a particular configuration. The ethnomethodological echoes here should be clear.

<sup>(16)</sup> The parallels with aspects of a nonrepresentational turn in human geography (Thrift, 1999; 2000a; 2000b) are significant.

<sup>(17)</sup> Were there more space, we could begin to elaborate upon the various ways in which ethnomethodology has developed topics first raised by the phenomenologists such as Husserl, Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, and Schutz (see Lynch, 1993, especially pages 117–158).

is less prone to the distortions smuggled in by other approaches as they endeavour to peer beneath the delicate surface specificity of the documents.<sup>(18)</sup>

Once again there are important parallels in how ethnomethodology takes seriously the grossly accessible features of the world that its researchers inhabit. Whereas other social sciences operate as if they were archaeologists in *another* sense, “reconstructing the society from its fragments and leftovers, for example, by analysing the contents of little used files collected by the many administrative organisations present in our society or pouring over tables of correlations” (Sharrock and Hughes, 2001), ethno-inquires face up to the surplus of detail provided by actual events at hand. Yet this willingness to start investigations where the ‘researcher is at’, without using the sophisticated methodologies which promise general explanations and models of larger social structures, leads to several misunderstandings. As Lynch and Bogen (1996, page 272) put it:

“Ethnomethodology’s orientation to singular details is often misunderstood as an epistemological perspective that credits the existence of local, micro or immediately visible events and actions, while denying the existence of larger, or more abstract, social and cultural phenomena (eg. power, the state, demographic trends, structures of inequality, systems of meaning etc.). Such thinking mistakes an investigative orientation to a phenomenal field—held to be real, intelligible, studiable and largely unstudied in the human sciences—with a metaphysical stance to the effect that anything beyond the limits of that field is a doubtful construction. Such a view is belied by the overt and repeated insistence by ethnomethodologists that ordinary language concepts and commonsense knowledge for most part are not lesser forms of knowledge requiring scientific validation. Vernacular conceptions of power, knowledge, meaning, historical context and so forth, are ubiquitous.”

Revealingly, Foucault’s work, by comparison, even though concerned with the minutiae of discipline, sexual practice, or medical vision, has never been taken as a microhistory. It has been ethnomethodology—in its preference for the near at hand and so obvious it has become hidden, over the metaphysical, transcendental, or invisible—that has almost always been taken as a form of microsociology which really ought to be paired up with appropriate macrosociologies to warrant any grander claims about society. This may be the worst combination possible, though, as it is nearly always macrosociologies to which ethnomethodology stands in radical disjuncture. What we envisage here as a shared commitment in these two different inquiries—Foucauldian and ethnomethodological—is hence a concern for the minute, for the local details, as not subordinate to but levelled with social order, with rules and regimes.<sup>(19)</sup>

Neither Foucault nor ethno-inquiries commence with clear-cut *definitions* of power or order, inspecting the world to see if they can find their stipulated form of power or order somewhere there. (This fact has several consequences, some of which we will deal with here and some of which we will return to later.) Both instead start with the materials that they have at hand, taking those materials seriously for their part in the production of social order:

“In both Foucault and ethnomethodology, it is possible to locate an abiding common concern with the local production of institutional orders, even if ethnomethodology

<sup>(18)</sup> Although Foucault is at times quite scathing about such endeavours, it should be noted that his advocacy “is not a way of saying that everyone else is wrong ... [it is not] trying to reduce others to silence, by damning what they say as worthless” (Foucault, 1972, page 17). His commitment is what Thrift (1996; 2000a) would describe as ‘modest theory’.

<sup>(19)</sup> This is not about combining a Foucauldian macrosociology (or macrohistory) with an ethnomethodological microhistory. We suspect that some of the actor-network-inspired theorising and research in human geography more recently (for example, Bingham, 1996; Murdoch, 1997a; 1997b; Thrift, 1996) is already helping to recast this micro–macro distinction.

is more consciously ‘analytic,’ preferring to ‘say’ how socio-logical problems and their practical solutions work rather than to ‘show’ how they might, as possibilities. In this respect Foucault refers to ‘eventalisation’ (as opposed to generalisation), whereas Garfinkel prefers to think of ‘invariance’ (Discourse) as a function or effect of contingency (discourse). Both, however, reject the idea that social practice is merely an effect of structurally given forms or ideal-rational rules behind the surface of visible action” (McHoul, 1996, pages 103–104).

The two approaches pursue cases where surface appearances are problematised less by the theorist, and more by certain persons, practices, and places: for Garfinkel (1967), it is Agnes as a candidate transsexual<sup>(20)</sup> passing as a woman; for Sacks (1972), it is the police looking at the streets without trust in appearances; and for Lynch and Bogen (1996), it is the prosecution trying to get the ‘truth’ out of Oliver North during his trial. For Foucault, meanwhile, history ‘provides for’ juxtapositions that demand an intellectual response, and in many respects his opening of many books, chapters, and papers with the ‘exceptional case’ (Lemert and Gillan, 1982, pages 30–32)—a finely honed description of a particular event, object, or creation (an execution, a decree, a painting, a strange list of animals)—reflects exactly this sense of the ‘stuff of the world’ as a prompt to thought, a problematising of the world often too easily smoothed out by the academician. In other words, the approaches rely not on a superbly clever abstract theorist thinking alone, but rather on finding an often marginalised or specialised group for whom what has become taken-for-granted and unproblematic by most of ‘us’ cannot be so for them. Foucault and the ethnomethodologists then have the charge to consult those people (alive or dead) as *serious* experts in producing, say, normal appearances, warranted observations, sincerity, class, gender, or whatever in the face of embodied, situational, and practical difficulties. They cannot treat the documented accounts or voiced experiences of these grounded experts as illusory, mistaken, or ideological, but rather treat them as making certain problems—we might call them ‘theoretical’ problems—particularly clear. By learning from those who deal with ‘theoretical’ problems as practical matters, perspicuous studies are provided for the purposes of vanquishing theory-driven sociologies and histories. All of this being said, in neither Foucault’s inquiries nor ethnomethodological studies do we encounter a garden-variety empiricism untouched by conceptual, grammatical, or theoretical investigations, as such matters are always being confronted insofar as they are thrown up *by and through* the people, practices, and places in question. It is perhaps, although we would be wary of ushering in all the troubles that go with such a term, a kind of ‘existential’ resolution to questions of possibility posed by theorists: a resolution that leaves the theorists, so often in a hurry to pose yet more questions, waiting around to find out if their initial questions were ones worth asking.

### Investigations must be done

So ‘what next?’ How are we going to start our next study? Almost certainly we will begin without trying to define one of the mighty topics of critical inquiry such as ‘power’ or ‘reason’ or ‘justice’ or ‘community’. Turning to Lynch and Bogen (1996, page 273) again, but this time on not being a priori:

“We are not proposing an inquiry free of presuppositions; instead, we are disclaiming that our inquiry is theory-laden in the sense of being framed by a professionally fashioned nexus of definitions, propositions, and *a priori* expectancies. The promise of such an approach is to gain a more differentiated appreciation of the phenomena

<sup>(20)</sup> A person waiting for medical assessment as to whether they will be accepted as ‘genuinely transsexual’ and then potentially undergo a sex change operation.

in question (and of their situated uses and fates) than we would gain if we were to address them as ‘concepts on holiday’. This sort of inquiry is not intended to satisfy certain popular academic demands for explanations, critiques of power, and systematic theories, and we doubt that many of our colleagues in the human sciences would want to follow the sort of path we have taken.”

Foucault, as we have noted above, refuses definitions of power as any kind of step towards revealing what power comprises and in what historical forms it has been exercised. Even a small claim by a historian requires the lengthy uncovering of its detailed architectures. Equally, Sacks comments that a definition of something as typically done in the social sciences is akin to erecting a headstone over a grave. Aside from burying the phenomenon, it in no way gives you the life that preceded the erection of the headstone. Avoiding stipulative treatments of social and historical phenomena is a central tenet of both approaches, and so in our investigations we will find ‘what next’ by encountering it, becoming immersed in it, living a life together (even in the archive)—in short, ‘becoming the phenomenon’. For us ‘what next?’ is not a call for definitions, it is more like an invitation for something else to come along which we *really* do not *yet* know—almost for us now an exclamation of surprise at what has happened so far and what could possibly happen next (as in ‘whatever next!’).

Garfinkel’s founding text *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967) can be a puzzling read for anyone hoping to gut the theoretical organs out of it. The book, like its founder, does not appear to have a heart.<sup>(21)</sup> Flicking through the chapters, you search in vain for definitions of social organisation, sexuality, or explanations of suicide statistics. Most readers at that point abandon it, weary of its lack of headlines, models, three point summaries, or a ‘Big Idea’. For those who go on and read the chapters, or numerous other papers by ethnomethodologists (Goodwin, 1997; Harper, 1998; Lynch, 1993; Orr, 1996; Pollner, 1987; Raffel, 1979; Sacks, 1972; Sharrock and Anderson, 1994; Suchman, 1987; Sudnow, 1972), each seems to stand by itself, building to no greater picture. Ethnomethodology seems belligerently unwilling to offer the reader a position outside of the details of each empirically exhausting study; it does not want to offer a heart to pluck out. Equally, one only has to browse through the pages of Foucault’s major texts, including *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, to realise that these are the creations of an historian sensitive in the last instance to the startlingly diverse substantive details encountered in the play of the historical record. Notwithstanding the attacks of some uncharitable critics, it is patently obvious that Foucault is far more interested in the colourful substantive nuances studding the histories of madness, medical perception, the human sciences, carceral practices, and sexuality than he is in producing the colourless and generalised notations of formal language systems. This state of affairs in Foucault’s project and the corpus of ethnomethodology is closely bound up with their complicated, if not to say, tense relation with theory.

Where Thrift (1997; 2000a) has used dance to fashion a sense of where his non-representational project might lead us next, Sacks mentions poetry as analogous to studies understood as nongeneralisable, without existing classification into a discipline, and as unacceptable in a paraphrased form:

“The upshot of what I’ve said is this: I make no commitment to what kind of placing anyone makes of what it is that I do, nor to whatever recommendations anyone might provide me, which turn on such a treatment. Now that will be very hard to accept, except under one condition: If I said I was maybe doing poetry, then, that one doesn’t want to accept somebody’s paraphrase, that one doesn’t want to treat

<sup>(21)</sup> To use a phrase from Deleuze and Guattari (1988), it would be appropriate to describe Garfinkel as a ‘body without organs’, and we mean this positively, if a little humorously.

the various classifications that are available as locating it, as fully dealing with it and equivalent to it, is acceptable under perfectly conventional views of what poetry does. For example, Paul Valery, in his book on the art of poetry, gives a characterisation of it which roughly is: ‘You have a poem when nothing that’s a paraphrase is equivalent to it; when you have to go back to the poem to find out what’s in it’” (Sacks, 1992a, page 621).

It is a simple point, and we have said it before several times ourselves: to grasp what the work of Foucault or Garfinkel and Sacks *is*, you have to try to do as they have done. They did not particularly want their published articles, monographs, and books to be cited; indeed, they wanted to show how imaginative, insightful, and surprising investigations could be done. From their work there is a double imperative: to be faithful to sources in your reading, hearing, and seeing, whilst also being faithful in your studies to the places, events, and occasions out of which they emerged. Never settling easily into the French or US university systems of teaching and researching, both Foucault and Garfinkel *kept* doing their long, detailed empirical studies without which their other more programmatic claims were unwarranted. The commitment to painstaking investigations of *this* or *that* was directed to more than facilitating grand claims about order, organisation, social facts, or whatever, and it was about much more than respecifying inappropriately formulated problems of theory. To repeat ourselves: theirs was a practical demonstration of how research might and could be done; they were less exhibiting ideas, and more showing us how to think with the materials that we can find in archives and in motion all around us. They show commitments in each and every case to a messy, ugly, bright, and beautiful world of creatures great and small.

**Acknowledgements.** Thanks to Deborah Dixon, John Paul Jones, and Mitch Rose for encouraging us to submit this paper to the ‘What next?’ theme issue, and thanks to the referees for their useful comments. Eric Laurier has been supported by an Urban Studies Fellowship and ESRC grant (R000239797) during the writing of this paper. Thanks as well to the staff at Offshore for providing us with a café, some sofas, and ‘coffee next’.

## References

- Anderson P, 1983 *In the Tracks of Historical Materialism* (Verso, London)
- Bingham N, 1996, “Object-ions: from technological determinism towards geographies of relations” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* **14** 635 – 657
- Bogen D, 1989, “A reappraisal of Habermas’s *Theory of Communicative Action* in light of detailed investigations of social praxis” *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour* **19** 47 – 77
- Bogen D, 1999 *Order Without Rules: Critical Theory and the Logic of Conversation* (State University of New York Press, New York)
- Callinicos A, 1982 *Is There a Future for Marxism?* (Macmillan, London)
- Coulter J, 1983 *Rethinking Cognitive Theory* (Macmillan, London)
- Coulter J, 1999, “Discourse and mind” *Human Studies* **22** 163 – 181
- Deleuze G, 1988 *Foucault* (Athlone Press, London)
- Deleuze G, Guattari, F, 1988 *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volume 2 (Athlone Press, London)
- Elden S, 2001 *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History* (Continuum, New York)
- Foucault M, 1970 *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (Tavistock Publications, Andover, Hants)
- Foucault M, 1971, “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire” [Nietzsche, genealogy, history], in *Hommage à Jean Hippolyte* (PUF, Paris)
- Foucault M, 1972 *The Archaeology of Knowledge* translated by A M Sheridan Smith (Tavistock Publications, Andover, Hants)
- Foucault M, 1973 *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception* (Tavistock Publications, Andover, Hants)
- Foucault M, 1977 *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Allen Lane, London)
- Foucault M, 1986, “Nietzsche, genealogy, history”, in *The Foucault Reader* Ed. P Rabinow (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx) pp 76 – 100

- Foucault M, 1988 *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (Vintage Books, New York)
- Garfinkel H, 1967 *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ)
- Garfinkel H, 1974, "The origins of the term 'ethnomethodology'", in *Ethnomethodology* Ed. R Turner (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, Middx) pp 13–18
- Garfinkel H, 2002 *Ethnomethodology's Program: Working out Durkheim's Aphorism* (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD)
- Garfinkel H, Sacks H, 1970, "On formal structures of practical actions", in *Theoretical Sociology: Perspectives and Developments* Eds J C McKinney, E A Tiryakian (Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York) pp 337–366
- Garfinkel H, Wieder D L, 1992, "Two incommensurable, asymmetrically alternate technologies of social analysis", in *Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology* Eds G Watson, R M Sieler (Sage, London) pp 175–206
- Goodwin C, 1997, "Transparent vision", in *Interaction and Grammar* Eds E Ochs, E A Schegloff, S A Thompson (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) pp 370–404
- Gregory D, 1978a *Ideology, Science and Human Geography* (Macmillan, London)
- Gregory D, 1978b, "The discourse of the past: phenomenology, structuralism and historical geography" *Journal of Historical Geography* 4 161–173
- Habermas J, 1980 *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA)
- Hacker P M S, 1989 *Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein* revised edition (Thoemmes Press, Bristol)
- Hacker P M S, 2000, "Was he trying to whistle it?", in *The New Wittgenstein* Eds R Read, A Crary (Routledge, London) pp 353–388
- Harper R, 1998 *Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology and Organisational Action* (Academic Press, London)
- Laurier E, 2001, "Why people say where they are during mobile phone calls" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 19 485–504
- Laurier E, Philo C, 1999, "X-morphising: a review essay of Bruno Latour's *Aramis or the Love of Technology*" *Environment and Planning A* 31 1047–1071
- Laurier E, Philo C, 2003a, "The region in the boot: mobilising lone subjects and multiple objects" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 21 85–106
- Laurier E, Philo C, 2003b, "Possible geographies: a passing encounter in a café", Department of Geography, University of Glasgow, online paper, [http://www.geog.gla.ac.uk/~elaurier/texts/possible\\_RGS.pdf](http://www.geog.gla.ac.uk/~elaurier/texts/possible_RGS.pdf)
- Laurier E, Whyte A, Buckner K, 2002, "Neighbouring as an occasioned activity: 'finding a lost cat'" *Space and Culture* 5 346–367
- Lemert C C, Gillan G, 1982 *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression* (Columbia University Press, New York)
- Ley D, 1977, "Social geography and the taken-for-granted world" *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, New Series* 2 498–512
- Ley D, 1978, "Social geography and social action", in *Humanistic Geography: Prospects and Problems* Eds D Ley, M S Samuels (Croom Helm, London) pp 41–57
- Livingston E, 1986 *The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Mathematics* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
- Livingston E, 1987 *Making Sense of Ethnomethodology* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
- Lynch M, 1993 *Scientific Practice and Ordinary Action: Ethnomethodology and Social Studies of Science* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
- Lynch M, 1997, "The ethnomethodological foundations of conversation analysis", paper presented at the conference 'Ethnomethodology, An Improbable Sociology?', Cerisy-la-Salle, France, copy available from M Lynch, Science and Technology Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
- Lynch M, 2001, "Ethnomethodology and the logic of practice", in *The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory* Eds T R Schatski, K Knorr Cetina, E von Savigny (Routledge, London) pp 131–148
- Lynch M, Bogen D, 1996 *The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text and Memory at the Iran-contra Hearings* (Duke University Press, Durham, NC)
- McHoul A, 1986, "The getting of sexuality: Foucault, Garfinkel and the analysis of sexual discourse" *Theory, Culture and Society* 3 65–80
- McHoul A, 1996 *Semiotic Investigations: Towards an Effective Semiotics* (University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE)
- McHoul A, Grace W, 1995 *A Foucault Primer: Discourse, Power and the Subject* (UCL Press, London)

- Matless D, 1992, "An occasion for geography: landscape, representation, and Foucault's corpus" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* **10** 41 – 56
- Megill A, 1985 *Prophets of Extremity: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA)
- Murdoch J, 1997a, "Towards a geography of heterogeneous associations" *Progress in Human Geography* **21** 321 – 337
- Murdoch J, 1997b, "Inhuman/nonhuman/human: actor-network theory and the prospects for a nondualistic and symmetrical perspective on nature and society" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* **15** 731 – 756
- Orr J E, 1996 *Talking About Machines: An Ethnography of a Modern Job* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York)
- Philo C, 1989, "Thoughts, words and 'creative locational acts'", in *The Behavioural Environment: Essays in Description, Application and Re-evaluation* Eds F W Boal, D N Livingstone (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London) pp 205 – 234
- Philo C, 1992, "Foucault's geography" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* **10** 137 – 161
- Philo C, 2000, "The Birth of the Clinic: an unknown work of medical geography" *Area* **32** 11 – 19
- Philo C, 2004 *The Space Reserved for Insanity: An Historical Geography of the 'Mad-business' in England and Wales to the 1860s* (Edwin Mellen Press, Lampeter, Wales)
- Pollner M, 1987 *Mundane Reason* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
- Raffel S, 1979 *Matters of Fact* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London)
- Rawls A W, 2002, "Editor's introduction", in *Ethnomethodology's Program: Working Out Durkheim's Aphorism* Ed. A W Rawls (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD) pp 1 – 64
- Sacks H, 1972, "Notes on police assessment of moral character", in *Studies in Social Interaction* Ed. D Sudnow (Free Press, Glencoe, IL) pp 280 – 293
- Sacks H, 1992a *Lectures on Conversation* volume 1 (Blackwell, Oxford)
- Sacks H, 1992b *Lectures on Conversation* volume 2 (Blackwell, Oxford)
- Saussure F de, 1983 *Course in General Linguistics* translated by R Harris (Duckworth, London)
- Sharp J P, Routledge P, Philo C, Paddison R, 2000, "Entanglements of power: geographies of domination/resistance", in *Entanglements of Power: Geographies of Domination/Resistance* Eds J P Sharp, P Routledge, C Philo, R Paddison (Routledge, London) pp 1 – 42
- Sharrock W, Anderson B, 1986, *The Ethnomethodologists* (Tavistock Publications, Andover, Hants)
- Sharrock W, Anderson B, 1994, "The user as a scenic feature of the design space" *Design Studies* **15** 5 – 18
- Sharrock W, Hughes J A, 2001, "Ethnography in the workplace: remarks on its theoretical bases" *Team Ethno* **1** <http://www.teamethno-online.org/>
- Suchman L, 1987 *Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human – Machine Communication* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
- Sudnow D, 1972, "Temporal parameters of interpersonal observation", in *Studies in Social Interaction* Ed. D Sudnow (Free Press, New York) pp 259 – 279
- Thrift N, 1996 *Spatial Formations* (Sage, London)
- Thrift N, 1997, "The still point: expressive embodiment and dance", in *Geographies of Resistance* Eds S Pile, M Keith (Routledge, London) pp 124 – 151
- Thrift N, 1999, "Steps to an ecology of place", in *Human Geography Today* Eds D Massey, J Allen, P Sarre (Polity Press, Cambridge) pp 295 – 322
- Thrift N, 2000a, "Afterwords" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* **18** 213 – 255
- Thrift N, 2000b, "Nonrepresentational theory", in *The Dictionary of Human Geography* Eds R J Johnston, et al, 4th edition (Blackwell, Oxford) page 556
- Watson R, 1992, "The understanding of language use in everyday life: is there a common ground?", in *Text in Context: Contributions to Ethnomethodology* Eds G Watson, R M Seiler (Sage, London) pp 1 – 19
- Wittgenstein L, 1953 *Philosophical Investigations* (Blackwell, Oxford)
- Wittgenstein L, 1961 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London), originally published in 1922
- Wittgenstein L, 1980 *Culture and Value* (Blackwell, Oxford)